

ER 86-09374

Office of Legislative Liaison

Routing Slip

TO:

	ACTION	INFO
1. D/OLL		X
2. DD/OLL		X
3. Admin Officer		
4. Liaison		
5. Legislation		X
6. Ch/Liaison		X
7. DCh/Liaison		
8.		
9.		
10.		

SUSPENSE

Date

Action Officer:

Remarks:

name/Date

7 March 86

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC	X			
10	GC		X		
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OKOCA		X		
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	VC/NIC		X (FULLER)		
17					
18					
19					
20					
21					
22					
SUSPENSE		18 Mar 86 Date			

Remarks

Although Gingrich only asked Poindexter for his comments, please provide your thoughts to DCI along with a brief draft response.

Executive Secretary

6 Mar 86

Date

3637 (10-81)

NEWELL GINGRICH
SIXTH DISTRICT, GEORGIA

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86- 0937x

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Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

February 21, 1986

Admiral John Poindexter
National Security Advisor
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear John:

We face one decisive hurdle in our efforts to implement the Reagan Doctrine of supporting Freedom Fighters against the Soviet Empire. Our central problem is the question of whether we are dealing with a series of specific isolated nation-state problems or whether there is a transnational Soviet Empire which poses a transnational problem. This essentially intellectual, analytical question lies at the heart of all our problems legally, diplomatically, militarily, and politically. If we resolve this central issue of transnational versus nation-state analysis, our core problems will be solvable.

I encountered the difference during my research on the Logan Act several years ago. It was clear from the debates in the U.S. Congress in the 1790s that the French revolution had begun the development of a new approach to international movements within nation-state frameworks. Congressmen were developing new opportunities to meet a new transnational threat to American survival. Many of the 1790's debates about revolutionary movements, Jacobin clubs, revolutionary ideology, and threats to our freedom, read as though they could be used today to describe the Soviet Empire, Leninism, and the Communist threat in our own backyard.

While we were beginning to develop an answer to a transnational threat in the the 1790's, those efforts ceased when the French Revolution was replaced with a more traditional Napoleonic Empire. The 19th Century became a time of nation-state diplomacy with clear lines of sovereignty, legality, and a sharp distinction between war and peace. With the end of the French revolution, that ceased to exist. Modern American diplomatic and legal theory, political language, and military strategy grew up in that era.

Today we face again the challenge of a transnational movement(Leninism) which builds a global threat to our freedom(the Soviet Empire) by using violence short of overt war to impose its will on people. If we are to meet this Soviet-Leninist transnational threat to our freedom, we must change our approach in five fundamental areas. Only with these major efforts will be successful in helping freedom fighters win the struggle against the Soviet Empire.

First, we need a legal, diplomatic, and cultural framework for victory which explains to ourselves and our allies why it is legitimate for a free society to undermine(and actively assist those undermining) a sovereign government with which we have diplomatic relations.

Our entire current tradition is based on the 19th century nation-state model which provides no theoretical or legal framework for explaining a revolutionary, transnational movement of democracies supporting freedom against the revolutionary, transnational movement of totalitarianisms supporting tyranny.

The Wilsonian tradition of war or peace between sovereign nations is an inadequate diplomatic framework for the reality of the late 20th Century. Until we create the legal, cultural, and diplomatic framework that explains our behavior, we will not be able to sustain American Public opinion or allied support for a strategy of helping freedom fighters.

Second, we must have a strategy for victory rather than a strategy for supporting the struggle. Similarly, in the long run, totalitarian governments will outlast charismatic freedom fighters, precisely as Max Weber argued. The bureaucratic politician always defeats the charismatic leader. Under current rules there is no battlefield on the planet in which freedom fighters will defeat totalitarians. Our Intelligence and Defense agencies are currently not structured to sustain a movement capable of winning on the battlefield. We must have the doctrine and strategy for victory, the equipment for victory, and the capacity to train and arm our allies to win victories, not simply bleed them more slowly. This will not occur without fundamental reform of the institutions of Intelligence and Defense.

Third, our goal with the public at large must be for the absence of disapproval, rather than for approval. In the last fifty years the American people have expressed a willingness to fight for Canada and Mexico, but virtually nowhere else. The American people are by nature not inclined to seek out conflict, and not inclined to meddle in other peoples' affairs. If we ask for their positive approval, we will never get it. We must simply ask for the benefit of the doubt. We must keep the risks low enough and the investments small enough so that people will tolerate it. We must say in effect "in this area in which you know little and we have studied greatly, we are going to follow an anti-Communist, pro-freedom policy unless you actively disapprove it. Within this strategy the odds are overwhelming that the American people will be inclined to trust their better informed public officials. There is a fundamental difference between gaining public approval for our efforts, which is very difficult, and avoiding public disapproval, which is much easier.

Fourth, the United States and its allies must develop a strategy which either slows down the rate at which the Soviet Union and its Cuban colonial police introduce new weapons, manpower, and resources into conflict, or it must accelerate the rate at which the U.S. and its allies introduce new weapons, resources, and manpower into conflict. In the current system, the Soviet Empire is consistently able to escalate faster and in a more sophisticated manner than is the West. If we provide rifles, they provide machine guns; if we provide machine guns, they provide armored cars; if we provide small unit training and anti-armored car equipment, they provide Hind helicopters. At each level they dominate the escalation ladder.

One possibility is to deter Soviet and Cuban actions through direct diplomatic confrontation, or by raising the costs of such activities through freedom fighter groups indicating their willingness to interdict supplies by whatever means are necessary. The alternative

would be to find systems of approval within the American Constitutional framework, such as an open ended authorization for the President, which would enable us to provide our allies with more sophisticated weapons and more resources than the Soviet Empire introduces them into a specific conflict. If we cannot solve this problem, we will inevitably lose because our system of government and its slow, protracted, and argumentative decision making style guarantees that the Soviets will know in advance what we are going to do, and therefore they will be able to counter it with more than enough margin of time and resources to insure a victory for the Communist side.

Fifth, Cuba is the colonial police force and linchpin for implementing the Soviet Empire's strategy in the Third World. There should be a specific strategy on our part designed to raise dramatically the cost of Cuban policing efforts on behalf of the Soviet Empire. That strategy should include an intense propaganda campaign against Cuban willingness to use its forces in imposing the new colonialism on other nations. It should include attacks in the U.N. which condemn Cuba. It should also include direct efforts to increase the economic costs of Cuban behavior.

An effort must be made to increase the attrition rate of Cuban personnel through deliberate efforts by freedom fighters. This might be done by setting up Radio Marti branches in Africa and Nicaragua which specifically offers a cash bonus and political asylum for every soldier who deserts. The bonus could rise with rank and value of equipment brought over. This would ensure a constant stream of Cuban troops deserting their dictatorship and appearing on U.S., European, and Latin American broadcasts explaining the nature of tyranny and the role of Soviets, East Germans, and Bulgarians.

The freedom fighters in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Nicaragua should announce that as long as the Cubans are willing to fight on their soil, they will recruit free Cubans to fight on Cuban soil and collectively begin to sponsor a Cuban brigade willing to infiltrate and cause economic sabotage in Cuba including the mining of Cuban harbors. Even if they don't do these things, these very proposals point out the unfairness of suggesting that Cuban troops can kill Angolans in Angola while Angolans can't strike back in Cuba. This will also raise the security costs to Castro, and psychologically cause his secret police and army greater difficulty.

Unless we adopt specific and systematic efforts to achieve these five fundamental changes in our current activities, there is no likelihood in the next decade of our succeeding in developing freedom fighter efforts. Each of these is a specific project line requiring its own strategy, operations, and tactics in order to be successful. Each of them should have somebody at a fairly high level assigned the task of achieving measurable change in the institutions, and cultivating public behaviour.

We must begin now to ensure success eventually. Please let me know what you think of this analysis.

Sincerely,



Newt Gingrich